The 'anti-economics' of the European common market by Krauss, Melvin B.
THE 'ANTI-ECONOMICS' OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 
With SPecial Reference to the Problem of Tax Harmonization 
MELVIN B. KRAUSS 
I WOULD like to preface my comments by extending a personal but public 
note of appreciation to the administrators, faculty and students of the 
Royal University for inviting me to visit and address this distinguished 
audience of scholars, business men and government officers, this evening 
on the theme of the 'Anti-Economics' of the European Common Market 
and its relation to the tax harmonization program of the Community. 
Perhaps the title of my talk warrants clarification? What is precisely 
meant by the 'anti-economics' of the European Economic Community for 
one; and what is meant by 'tax harmonization' for the other? And even 
more important, why should this distinguished gathering be interested in 
either one of them? 
By 'anti-economics' I mean simply the subordination of economic 
policy to political objectives - or more simply, the use of economic 
means for political ends. Before discussing these political motives in 
the EEC, the question arises as to the proper role for economic research 
when it is accepted that the objective of government policy is non-eco-
nomic in nature? The question is a controversial one, which resolves 
itself into two essentially conflicting points of view. The first tacitly 
accepts the non-economic objective of government policy and tries to 
work within it - so to speak - by developing analyses whose purpose is 
to achieve the non-economic- objective at a minimum cost in terms of 
foregone real income to the community. The second approach to non-
economic government asks what are the economic consequences (costs 
or perhaps benefits) of government's economic 'irrationality' and poses 
the question as to whether the non-economic benefits are worth the net 
economic costs. One important by-product of such research is the ques-
tioning of the value of the non-economic objective and the possibility of 
its rejection should its costs to the community be deemed greater than 
its benefits. 
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Can the title of 'anti-economic' be fairly ascribed to the various poli-
cies that are a part of or at least promise to be a part of the EEC land-
scape? Are EEC policies concerning economic and monetary union, tax 
harmonization and agriculture 'anti-economic' in the sense that I have 
defined the term? To answer this question, one either must have suffi-
cient knowledge of the motivation behind EEC policies or, lacking that, 
compare EEC policies with known and accepted economic criteria - ef-
ficient resource allocation, economic growth, internal and external equi-
librium (that is, the desired combination of internal inflatio~ and unem-
ployment consistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium). Should the 
EEC policies prove deficient from the perspective of these criteria -
and there is wide consensus that they do - we are left either with the 
conclusion that the Common Market authorities do not know what they 
are doing - which I choose to reject for obvious reasons - or that they 
do know what they are doing but they are not doing what we - that is, 
the economists - want them to do. The weakness of this second proce-
dure of comparing Common Market policies to economic criteria is that 
while it can satisfactorily establish what the motive for Communiry po-
licy is not, it does not establish what the motive for Communiry policy in 
fact is. For this, the economist must venture outside the convenient 
world of abstract theoretical models that we have so painstakingly con-
structed for oursel ves. 
Under these conditions, implying the motive of Communiry policy from 
the facts of experience would seem to be more within the mandate of the 
political rather than the economic analyst. But a few comments or ob-
servations would seem to be warranted if I may be so allowed. Communi-
ry policy at present appears to be imbued with what can be called 'Euro-
peanism', but which in a less public relations-oriented context is known 
simply as supra-nationalism or federalism. Three types of federalism can 
be discerned in Western Europe today - the Dutch type, associated with 
the names of such men as Sicco Mansholt and Jan Tinbergen, who viewa 
first step towards world socialism which they feel is necessary to a-
chieve a redistribution of the world's income and wealth from the rich 
nations to the poor ,ones; the French type, which is strictly an ecbnomic 
federalism, bv which I mean the achievement of a common European eco-
nomic policy which they, the French, hope to control for purposes of re-
storing lost French prestige and grandeur; and a less well defined but 
more pervasive type which has as its goal European independence of 
both the Americans on one side and the Russians on the other. Without 
commenting on the merits and demerits of these motives from a non-eco-
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nomic viewpoint, I think that they are capable of making sense out of the 
seemingly non-sensical policies of European Economic and Monetary 
Union, where member-states must adopt common rates of inflation; the 
Common Agricultural Policy where the form of free trade hides the fact 
of protectionism within the Communiry, with no such attempt being made 
to camouflage the blatant protectionism of the CAP with respect to the 
Communiry's relationship with third countries; and Tax Harmonization, 
the subject of my lecture this evening. 
The tax harmonization program of the EEC, as set out in the 1963 
Neumark Report, consists of three parts; the adoption of the value-added 
tax, the abolition of tax frontiers between member-states with respect to 
their intra-union trade, and the equalization of value-added tax rates. 
Properly interpreted, the adoption of the value-added tax, which refers to 
a method of taxation and not to some specific new kind of tax on eco-
nomic activiry, is not essentially a matter of tax harmonization, a con-
cept whose underlying principle is that tax system in no way interfere 
with the benefits accruing to the members of an economic union from 
trade liberalization; but is more a matter of tax reform, in that in most of 
the Common Market countries, with the prime exception being France, the 
value-added tax has replaced the cumbersome, inequitous, and inefficient 
gross turnover or cascade-type sales tax, a change warranted more by the 
desire to bring a greater degree of equity and efficiency into the tax 
structure than by participation in an economic integration project. Still 
perhaps because of the success the Benelux countries and Germany are 
making of the transition to a system of value-added rax, itself in no 
small part due to the fact that politicians have seized upon the introduc-
tion of the new tax as a convenient smoke screen behind which they could 
raise average sales tax rates and blame it on the new tax, the value-
added tax has become the symbol if not the essence of the EEC tax 
harmonization program. 
Because the value-added tax is largely an unfamiliar tax, and also 
because it may become relevant to Malta, it seems appropriate to go into 
more detail concerning its nature and mechanics. The value-added tax is 
a device for levying taxes on a piecemeal basis, stage by stage, while 
avoiding double taxation, so that the tax collected in relation to final 
product will be precisely equivalent to that obtained by a single 'stage 
tax levied on the same aggregate base with the same ad valorem rate. In 
a closed economy, it can readily be shown that there are three major 
types of value-added tax: (1) a 'gross-product' VAT, which is equivalent 
to an equal rate-fully-general sales tax on all final goods and services 
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that is, G.N.P.; (2) an 'income .type' VAT, equivalent to an equal pro-
portional tax on total factor income; and (3) a 'consumption type' VAT, 
equivalent to a tax on final consumption goods only. In its mostpopular 
version as a consumption tax, the VAT base may be set equivalent to 
that of any of the familiar sales taxes (manufacturers', wholesale, retail). 
In fact, until Denmark led the way in 1967 with a VAT extending through 
to the retail stage, no VAT extended further than the wholesale (i.e. 
sales to retailer) level. At the present time, however, all European ex-
amples of VAT are consumption taxes of more or less the Danish type; 
the only current examples of the income and product varieties of VAT are 
taxes recently proposed in several Latin American countries. 
There are several ways of calculating and collecting value-added tax, 
the 'addition' method, the 'substraction' method, and the 'tax credit' 
method, but only the 'tax credit' method of consumption type VAt will 
be demonstrated. With this method firms apply the ad valorem VAT levy 
to their gross sales, and then receive full credit for the VAT embodied in 
any supplies suitably invoiced to prove that supplying firms have paid 
their VAT assessment. This self-policing feature is considered by gov-
ernment officials to be one of the main advantages of a VAT as com-
pared wi th a single-stage levy where Inland Revenue itself must insure 
that the proper amount of tax is being paid. Let us use a simple arith-
metical example to see how a value-added tax works with the tax-credit 
method of collection. 
TAX TAX ON PAY. TO VALUE 
EXCL. PRICE TRANS. AT 10% TAX AUTIl. ADDED 
1. Manufacturer (1) 25 2.50 2.50 25 
2. Manufactuerr (2) 50 5.00 2.50 25 
3. Wholesaler 75 7.50 2.50 25 
4. Retailer 100 10.00 2.50 25 
Tax-ExcIusi ve price 
paid by consumer 100 100 
Fiscal economists have long been interested in the effects of taxes on 
efficient resource allocation. Traditionally, these discussions have 
ignored the method by which the taxes are imposed because on the one 
hand, application was, after all, only a question of administration, while, 
on the other, the underlying analytical model considered the factors of 
production as 'original', thus implying a simplified productive process in 
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which intermediate products were ignored. However, once the productive 
process is conceived of as a series of steps along which value is added 
at each level to that supplied by the original productive factors, it be-
comes apparent that the method of taxation, by discriminating between 
different forms of business enterprise, can effect the method of doing 
business. Indeed, once it is realized that the outpUt of one industry may 
very well be the input of some other industry, and that a tax on the for-
mer constitutes one on the latter as well, it becomes necessary to focus 
analytical attention on the effect of the entire tax strUcture on productive 
processes rather than on the effect of a single tax on commodities prod-
uced by these processes. 
Arguments along these lines have been important in leading the EEC 
and other European countries to replace their gross turnover taxes by a 
VAT to improve efficiency. Because the amount of tax a given commodity 
bears wi th a V AT, unlike a gross turnover tax, is independent 0 f the 
number of transactions undergone by that commodity during the process 
of production and distribution, and independent of the relative amounts 
of value-added accrued at tne several stages of production and disttibu~ 
cion, a VAT will be neutral with respect to the structure of business en-
terprise. In addition, since the tax is levied as a constant proportion of 
value added at each stage in the production-distribution process, it is a 
constant proportion of total value added, and thus readily identifiable 
when, under the destination principle, export rebates and import com-
pensatory duties are effected for goods crossing international borders. 
This condition will permit precise border tax adjustments, so that a tax 
intended to be reflected in higher prices to consumers (with destination 
principle adjustments) does not affect an industry's international com-
petitive position by altering relative commodity price ratios. Such pre-
cision is quite unattainable with a gross turnover tax, although there 
have been no empirical studies indicating the degree to which vertical 
integration and imprecise border tax adjustments have in fact been en-
couraged by the gross turnover tax in continental Europe. 
Adoption of the value-added tax has become part of the membership 
dues for new entrants into the Community - proof of one's Europeanism 
- and Britain presently is busy preparing itself for the changeover that 
is scheduled to occur this Spring. In Britain, where the value-added tax 
is replacing a set of selective excises and the unpopular SET (Selective 
Employment Tax), the efficiency argument for VAT is that it will bring a 
greater degree of generality into the fiscal structure. Be that as it may, 
what one is really struck with in present Britain is the pressure being 
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applied to Treasury by all sorts of special interest groups, each armed 
with incontrovertable evidence as to why it should be exempt from the 
new tax. The result of all this is that the tax that is supposed to be 
general soon degenerates into something resembling the set of selective 
excises that it is replacing. Inroads into generality take three paths; 
that of different rates for different products, tax exemption and zero-
rated tax. The difference between a zero rate and a tax exemption can be 
illustrated by use of a simple table. 
TAX TAX ON TAX PAYMENT TAX PAYMENT 
EXCLUSIVE PRICE TRANSACTION WITH ZERO RA TE WITH EXEMPTION 
1. 25 2.50 2.50 2.50 
2. 50 5.00 2.50 2.50 
3. 75 7.50 2.50 2.50 
4. 100 0 -7.50 0 
100 0 7.50 
The prime objective of the tax harmonization program, however, is not 
the adoption of the value-added tax but the abolition of tax frontiers be-
tween member-states in their intra-union trade, though retention of tax 
frontiers is envisaged with respect to trade between third countries and 
the Community. Tax frontiers refer to destination principle border tax 
adjustments, which are one of the two possible principles of border tax 
adjustment that a nation can apply to its international trade - the other 
being the origin principle. Under the destination principle, explicit ex-
port" tax rebates and import compensatory duties are intended to guaran-
tee that all goods consumed within the taxing jurisdiction are equally 
taxed regardless of where they are produced; while under the origin prin-
ciple exports are taxed and imports exempted to insure that all goods 
produced within the taxing jurisdi ction are equally burdened regardless 
of where they are consumed. Most sales taxes in the world today - not 
just those collected by the VAT methods - are on the destination basis. 
The introduction of value-added taxation and the adoption of a principle 
of border tax adjustment are, of course, logically quite separate ques-
tions. 
It should be mentioned in connection with the issue of border tax ad-
justments that there is an essential distinction to be drawn between a 
border tax, which properly understood is a tax on the crossing by trade 
of international frontiers (a tariff, for example) and hence restricts trade 
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volumes below what would be indicated as desirable by the principle of 
comparative advantage; and a border tax adjustment, which is an adjust-
ment of the taxes imposed on a producer when the goods he produces 
cross an international border. Tax frontiers and customs fronciers thus 
serve opposite functions in the world economy, the former being a trade 
liberalizing one, the latter being protectionist. Though this often has 
been misrepresented or misunderstood in EEC policy circles, the objec-
tion to tax frontiers, at least by the better informed Neumark Committee, 
has not been based on reasons of efficient resources allocation, but a 
political supranationalistic one. 
Abolishing intra-Community tax frontiers implies that, with respect to 
such trade, exports will be taxed at a rate equal to that borne by domes-
tically produced and consumed goods, and imports admitted to the taxing 
jurisdiction tax free; accordingly, such change will tend to produce bal-
ance-of-payments deficits in those countries with relatively high average 
rates of value-added tax and balance-of-payments surpluses in countries 
wi th low average rates. For this reason the Neumark Report has recom-
mended that value-added tax rates be equalized in all member-states 
before tax frontiers are abolished, a proposal vigorously defended by the 
supra-nationalists though one presumes more for the 'common-action' it 
implies than for reasons of the balance of payments. For high-tax mem-
ber countries this implies a smaller public sector and for low-tax coun-
tries a larger public sector than would exist in the absence of the EEC 
tax harmonization commitment or, if the size of the public sector is 
to be maintained, a change in the mix of direct and indirect taxes that 
had hitherto been deemed appropriate. \,('hen one considers the vast dif-
ferences existing between EEC members in respect to both the size of 
their public sectors and the opcimal mix of direct and indirect taxes (in-
come as opposed to sales taxes), the 'anti-economic' aspects of the EEC 
tax harmonization program cannot be easily exaggerated. 
A case in point is the Benelux Economic Union where the two major 
partners, Belgium and The Netherlands, follow widely divergent fiscal 
policies. Because of strong regional and cuI rural differences with Bel-
gium, the national government in that country has found it difficult to 
collect income tax and thus relies more heavily on sales taxes than do 
the Dutch, who have a greater sense of nacional cohesion. The point is 
that there are sharp differences between Belgians and Dutch and these 
differences are reflected in their fiscal srrucrures. Erasing the differen-
ces between the fiscal structures of the two countries, however, will not 
erase the differences between the Belgians and the Dutch. The failure 
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to equalize tax rates in the Benelux Economic Union despite consider-
able effort to that effect should serve as a lesson to the EEC that am-
bitious anti-economic programs have little chance of success unless 
they serve the needs of the people as they in fact exist rather than as 
the supra-nationalists imagine them to. 
The equalization of value-added tax rates in the EEC clearly is re-
lated to the desire to eliminate tax frontiers between member states -
that is, the switch from destination to origin principle border tax ad-
justments with respect to intra-union trade; - and the question arises as 
to why this change is felt to be necessary within the EEC. As I have 
previously argued, scientific economics has demonstrated that tax fron-
tiers do not interfere with efficient resource allocation or any other 
known economic objective to my knowledge. The purpose of the aboli-
tion of tax frontiers in the Communi ry , and the Neumark Report is very 
clear on this, is not related to economic objective, however, but the 
political one of establishing within the Communiry conditions analogous 
to those of an internal market. After all, it is argued, internal markets 
are seldom partitioned by tax frontiers, and sin ce this is envisioned to 
be the goal to which the Common Market aspires, tax frontiers have been 
deemed incompatible with the Common Mar ket concept. But the question 
arises as to whose Common Market concept the tax frontiers are incom-
patible with? 
In the case of the Neumark Report, it is clear that the Common Market 
referred to is that of the establishment of a United States of Europe, 
though one assumes the name will be different. It is not only the Neu-
mark Report's call for the abolition of tax frontiers with respect to intra-
union trade that implies this interpretation of tax harmonization in the 
EEC, it is also its call for the adoption of value-added taxation and the 
equalization of value-added tax rates. With respect to this last-men-
tioned factor, it should be pointed out that given differences in average 
sales tax rates between the partners, high ta.:.:: countries will suffer a 
deficit in their balance-of-payments vis a vis their partners regardless of 
whether tax frontiers are removed or not, since the equalization of sales 
tax rates behind tax frontiers implies a reduction in destination principle 
border tax adjustments whose balance-of-payments effect is identical to 
that which would occur if tax frontiers are removed without tax rate equa-
lization. The point is that the high-tax country cannot avoid the balance-
of-payments implications of removing tax frontiers by equalizing tax 
rates before their removal as has been assumed by the Communiry. In 
any event, the issue of border tax adjustments is essentially a mone-
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tary one; so long as taxation is general, different rates of commodity 
taxation in different countries are compatible with efficient resource al-
location regardless of whether there are tax frontiers or not. Balance-of-
payments deficits or surpluses induced by the removal or adjustment of 
tax frontiers can be expected to be absorbed either by the currency ex-
change rate or, if this is held fixed, the internal level of prices and in-
come s. To translate this rather abstract piece of analysis to the real 
world of policy, its implication is that participation by a country in an 
economic union requires neither large-scale structural changes between 
direct and indirect taxation; nor substantial changes in the level of tax 
rates, nor modification of existing systems of border tax adjustment for 
reasons of efficient resource allocation. The sole adjustment necessary 
is to make the effect of the tax system as general as possible - a con-
clusion that should come as no surprise to those well-versed in the pub-
lic finance literature. 
As I have previously argued, the proper role of economic research 
when it is accepted that the motivation of economic policy is political 
rather than economic is to ascertain the economic costs of such policies 
and ask the question - which the public alone can answer - as to whe-
ther the economic costs are worth it or not. In the case of EEC tax har-
monization, the economic costs are clear: member countries are forced 
to abandon tried and true methods of raising public revenues for new and 
untried methods. The adoption of the value-added tax in Italy, for ex-
ample, has been chaotic; in the U.K. less chaotic but just as painful 
adjustments will have to be made. If such change were to guarantee a 
more efficient equitable fiscal structure, economists could applaud it, 
though even in this case the question remains as to why these countries 
have waited until the change has been virtually forced upon them. But if, 
as is the case, the motive for the change is strictly political - indeed a 
political motive that the countries do not equally share - economists 
must be first in pointing out the costs the member states are inflicting 
upon themselves in the form of deviations away from optimal fiscal sys-
tems - optimal, that is in the sense of long-standing cuI rural, sociolo-
gical, and political patterns - and ask whether these costs are worth the 
political benefits of such action, an issue that up to now the politicians 
have avoided by falsely claiming that the move to value-added taxation 
has been rendered necessary solely by economic considerations. Every 
club must have its symbol, and the value-added tax has become that sym-
bol for the EEC (it is interesting in this respect to speculate what the 
EEC would do if the United States were to adopt a value-added tax, 
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which by the way is presently being considered by the Nixon Admini-
stration. Would the nations of Europe then go back to cascade-type turn-
over taxation one wonders?). 
A question that has probably struck more than one of you by now is 
what would be the implications of EEC tax harmonization for Malta 
should at some future date the islands decide to become a full-fledged 
EEC member, with all its rights, privileges and, of course, responsibi-
lities. This, to many, mJuld seem now a greater possibility than pre-
viously thought to be the case given what British entry and the loss of 
COlIlfllonwealth Preference, combined with the Common Agricultural Poli-
cy and perhaps a high Common External Tariff might mean for the Mal-
tese economy. 
The most important implication for Malta surely would be the neces-
sity to adopt the value-added tax. And though sllch adoption would dear-
ly be a political pre-condition for entry, it would be consistent with the 
Stolper Report's Recommendation of some years ago that 'the Government 
actively consider the introduction of a general tax in retail sales'. 
There has been, in recent years, considerable support for the use of a 
broad-based general value-added tax in developing countries. Most re-
cently, in a yet unpublished paper, Ronald McKinnon most forcefully and 
convincingly has argued the benefits of such a tax, especially in eco-
nomics where customs duties constitute a large percentage of public 
revenues - the Maltese case. One of his arguments relates to distinction 
made, in a Maltese context, by Sal vino Busuttil who noted the difference 
between revenue or fiscal tariffs on the one hand, and protective tariffs 
on the other. The main purpose of revenue tariffs is to raise money for 
the public exchequer; the main purpose of protection tariffs is to sub-
sidize local industty. The two are not entirely disconnected, however, 
since protective tariffs rather than direct production subsidies are often 
used for subsidization of local enterprise in developing countries, be-
cause local governments do not have the financial where-with-all to fin-
ance the subsidies from exchequer funds. The beauty of the tariff is that 
it gives the impression that it is the foreigner who pays; but the argu-
ment is a false one, since the domestic consumer pays as well by having 
to pay a higher price for the good than would otherwise be the case. 
Drawing on his experience from Ethiopia, McKinnon warns us to the 
danger of using tariffs for revenue purposes because, 'they tend to be-
come "protective" as capital becomes available for industrialization. 
Resources are drawn into industries - particularly those producing -lux-
ury- consumer goods - by historical accident, since it is precisely these 
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goods that tend to be taxed for revenue purposes.' The result can be a 
mis-allocation of scarce resources to industries that are not appropriate 
to a country's economic development. A further shortcoming of heavy re-
liance on customs duties for revenue purposes pointed out by McKinnon 
is that they tend to be inelastic to rising income, since import-substitu-
ting industrialization which takes place behind tariff walls initially de-
signed to raise revenue empties the public exchequer as imports decline. 
On the other hand, a broad-based VAT - on the destination principle -
would enable a country like Malta to preserve its revenue base in foreign 
trade more easily as it industrializes. 
It should be mentioned in this respect that should a value-added tax 
be adopted by Malta, the Community's expressed desire to eliminate tax 
frontiers between member states could have a disasterous revenue effect 
for the Islands, since so much of Malta's trade is carried on with the 
Community, especially now with British entry. This, of course, is an ar-
gument against abolishing tax frontiers not against adopting a value-
added tax. A further argument related to budgetary revenue and Com-
munity policy is that of the effect of adopting the common external tariff 
on such revenue. We are all familiar with the famous 'trade deflection' 
argument by now - how with different tariffs vis a vis the outside world 
and no tariffs vis a vis member states, goods would tend to enter the 
high tariff country through the low-tariff one. Presumably 'rules of origin' 
can handle such situations. But if in the name of the 'New Europeanism' 
Malta is asked - indeed required - to adjust its tariffs to those of the 
other member states, revenue tariffs may have to be lowered on some 
items and raised on others in a manner that is not consistent with Mal-
tese standards of equity and need. The point is that with a value-added 
tax, Malta would be in a much better position to adjust the burden of tax-
ation as it sees fit than it would be under the present system of revenue 
duties should Malta join the EEC in a customs union. 
Besides preventing accidental protection by having revenue tariffs be-
come protective ones, the use of a value-added tax could have another 
substantial efficiency advantage in a LDC by enabling governments to 
dis continue their present practice of using the tariff for protection of lo-
cal enterprise. With a broad-based value-added tax, tax exemption could 
be pinpointed at the desired stage in the production-distribution process 
and government have enough fiscal reserve to withstand these intrusions 
on its revenue even if the tax were imposed at relatively modest rates. 
The value-added tax is a selective instrument of control. In comparison, 
the tariff is a clumsy one, hitting consumers unnecessarily and granting 
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protection indiscriminately to all stages of domestic enterprise. 
A final argument that can be registered for the value-added tax that 
could be relevant for the Maltese situation is that use of a general con-
sumption tax would preclude the need for further personal income taxa-
tion. The Busuttil Report was very convincing on this point: in an eco-
nomy- that wants and needs entrepreneurship, a tax on personal income 
can be very costly in terms of industrialization foregone. 
To summarize, there would appear to be substantial advantage for Mal-
ta from adoption of a broad-based value-added tax of the consumption 
variety. These advantages would hold true - indeed be exaggerated -
should such adoption be independent of the EEC. Membership in the EEC 
might force upon Malta an increased reliance on personal income taxation 
that has hitherto been deemed undesirable. Abolition of intra-union tax 
frontiers could substantially cut into the budgetary revenue gains' that 
Malta could expect from the tax. Unilateral adoption of a value-added 
tax, on the other hand, may convince the powers that be in Bruxelles 
that Malta is indeed European, or at least subscribes to the EEC con-
ception of what Europeanism means, and thus be more sympathetic to 
Maltese terms in the forthcoming second round of negotiations for tariff 
reductions. 
My remarks to this point have focussed on what can be called the 
'micro-economic' or resource allocation aspects of tax harmonization in 
the EEC. Some attention must now be paid to the 'macro-economic' or 
economic stabilization aspects of this program. 
In a 'macro-economic' context, the prime question of relevance is whe-
ther if!dividual member countries will have the ability to run autonomous 
fiscal policies within their overall commitment to the EEC tax harmoni-
zation program. Two types of autonomy can be usefully distinguished, 
'nominal' autonomy and 'effective' autonomy. Nominal autonomy refers to 
the ability of a member government to run a different budgetary when bud-
getary policy simply refers to the budget itself and not the effect that 
the budget might have on macro-economic variables. Such nominal auto-
nomy depends on the scope or coverage of the tax harmonization propo-
sals. A program that constrained all countries to the same community-
determined level of taxes and expenditure would preclude even this mo-
dicum of fiscal independence. The EEC program, however, is not nearly 
so thorough-going, and there would seem to be no present statutory limi-
tation on the freedom of individual countries to varying expenditure le-
vels and tax rates as they see fit, though the commitment to equalize 
VAT-rates implies that direct taxation would have to be used for this 
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purpose. 'Effective' autonomy, on the other hand, does not simply refer 
to the ability of a member-state to have a different budgetary policy from 
that of its partners, but from having a different macro-economic result 
from that budgetary policy in terms of the rate of inflation that the given 
country wants to pursue. Can a member-state run a different rate of infla-
tion from that of its partners because of different budgetary policies within 
its overall tax-harmonization commitment? 
The answer to this question depends on the context in which the auto-
nomous policy is attempted. Abstracting from other harmonization poli-
cies, there would appear to be no reason why even 'effective' autonomy 
could not be achieved. This, however, is not the present case in the 
EEC where monetary union is being attempted. EEC monetary union re-
quires that all countries run the same rate of inflation, regardless of the 
repercussion of this policy for unemployment levels in the various states. 
Given such a commitment, 'effective' fiscal autonomy clearly is not pos-
sible - hence, the argument that the unemployment consequences of mo-
netary union can be offset by fiscal action is not tenable. An effective 
monetary union would take all macro-economic initiatives ,out of the hands 
of the member states, leaving a void that could only be filled by some 
new supra-nationalistic instimtion. 
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